Civic Governmentality: The Politics of Inclusion in Beirut and Mumbai

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Abstract: This article is concerned with the politics of inclusion. It analyzes the institutionalization of participatory citizenship as the formation of regimes of “civic governmentality”. Through the study of key civil society organizations such as SPARC and Hezbollah, it studies three dimensions of civic governmentality: an infrastructure of populist mediation; technologies of governing (for example, knowledge production); and norms of self-rule (for example, concepts of civility and civicness). However, such regimes of civic governmentality operate within frontiers of urban renewal and indeed often facilitate and manage such types of development. The article examines the limits and contradictions of the politics of inclusion in the context of the bourgeois city and also studies radical forms of citizenship that emerge to challenge these limits.

Keywords: civil society, governmentality, urban citizenship, urban politics

We could have stormed the barricades ... but we chose otherwise (Sheela Patel, quoted in the prologue of Mitlin and Patel 2005b:3).

The twenty-first century metropolis is a paradoxical space. On the one hand, it is shaped by grassroots citizenship, civil society energies, and social mobilizations. This populist mood is also constantly institutionalized by development conditionalities that insist upon “participatory” frameworks of planning and reform. On the other hand, the contemporary city is marked by deepening forms of inequality, the speeding up of displacements, and the entrenchment of segregations and separations that territorialize urban identities in enclave geographies. While there is a formidable body of work on contours of exclusion, there is less rigorous discussion of the politics of inclusion. In this paper, I pose two sets of questions about the inclusive city. First, what are the ways in which regimes of participation and inclusion are instituted and institutionalized? What are the governable subjects and governable spaces thus produced? In other words, how are regimes of participation and inclusion also regimes of “civic governmentality”? Second, how is civic governmentality related to more rebellious forms of citizenship and mobilization? In the politics of inclusion, what is the dialectical movement between insurgency and institutionalization? How is the ideal...
of inclusion formalized in regimes of civic governmentality but then disrupted and challenged by new and more radical forms of inclusion?

In exploring these questions, I put forward the analytic concept of “civic governmentality”. The idea of governmentality derives of course from Foucault’s analysis of the rationalities and mentalities of government. Government, in turn, is conceptualized as the calculated direction of human conduct, “the conduct of conduct” (Dean 1999:2). The art of government is distinct from sovereignty, the exercise of power by the state over a defined territory, and from discipline, the control and regulation of bodies. Government, by contrast, unfolds through the mobilization of the interests and aspirations of the governable and self-governing self, ie through willed, free, self-determining, even empowered, subjects. This “ethics of the self” is thus a central aspect of governmentality. But also important is how the art of government reconstitutes practices of sovereignty and discipline. The “governmentalization of the state” implies that government, while distinct from sovereignty, also transforms the way in which sovereignty is exercised (Dean 1999:6). In short, Foucault conceives sovereignty, discipline and government as an assemblage of authority and ethics rather than as distinctive modes of power. In recent years, scholars have paid considerable attention to how this assemblage functions through the governance of space, ie through “spatial governmentality” (Merry 2001). The construction of governable subjects is thus seen to be the construction of governable spaces. In the study of spatial politics, scholars are also making a distinction between governmentality and “counter-governmentality”, between “governmentality from above” and “governmentality from below”, between “civil society” and “political society” (Appadurai 2002; Chatterjee 2004).

The concept of “civic governmentality” builds on, and yet departs from, such conceptualizations of governmentality. In keeping with the scholarship on governmentality, I envision civic governmentality as a spatialized regime that functions through particular mentalities or rationalities. These include an infrastructure of populist mediation; technologies of governing (for example, knowledge production); and norms of self-rule (for example, concepts of civility and civicness). However, I reject the distinction that Appadurai and Chatterjee draw between “governmentality from the top” and “governmentality from below”. I focus on grassroots organizations that seek to construct and manage a civic realm. As Ferguson and Gupta (2002:983) note, these domains of citizenship cannot be simply imagined as a “middle zone of contact or mediation”, a bridge between the “state up there” and the “community down here”. Instead, these grassroots regimes of government both resist and comply with what may be perceived to be top-down forms of rule, be it those emanating from the state or from international institutions. Such civic regimes produce
a “governmentalization of the state”, recreating the terms of rule and citizenship. At the same time, there is also a “civilizing” of political society, such that grassroots governmentality comes to turn on formations of civic identity and a broader civic commitment to the idea of a unified city. Such processes become sharply evident when the question of spatial governmentality is expanded to include not only governable spaces and disciplined subjects but also forms of self-rule in the context of the production of space in the bourgeois city. Within regimes of civic governmentality, the urban subject is simultaneously empowered and self-disciplined, civil and mobilized, displaced and compensated. Such contradictions constitute the politics of inclusion and indicate the ways in which urban struggles involve much more than “inside” and “outside” geographies. There is a great deal to be learned about power and authority by studying how subjects and spaces come to be “inside” the project of citizenship.

In my study of the politics of inclusion, I focus on two urban sites of inclusion. One is the city of Mumbai, which is home to the Alliance, an institutional ensemble that includes an urban NGO, the Society for the Promotion of Area Resources (SPARC), the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) and Mahila Milan, a network of women’s groups. This paper is especially concerned with the role of SPARC. The work of the Alliance among pavement dwellers, slum dwellers and squatters has been celebrated by many as a paradigmatic case of “deep democracy”, “rights from below” and “counter-governmentality” (Appadurai 2002). Yet, in 2005, Mumbai witnessed brutal slum demolitions and evictions, with over 300,000 people rendered homeless in a matter of weeks. A new social movement of protest and resistance was unleashed, eroding SPARC’s carefully constructed regime of civic governmentality. How and why was this the case? The second site is the city of Beirut, marked by rounds of devastating war and spectacular reconstruction. Perhaps the most influential urban actor in Beirut’s politics of inclusion is Hezbollah. Often vilified as a “terrorist” organization, Hezbollah is in fact a vast social welfare and development apparatus whose work on behalf of poor and displaced Shiites is recognized as “radical planning” (Saliba 2000). Yet the question that must be asked is how this radical planning resists or confronts the neoliberal transformation of Beirut. In short, the two sites present two cases of grassroots organizations that have been highly successful in institutionalizing urban inclusion. However, the cityscapes in which these organizations are located are dynamic frontiers of urban development. What is the relationship between such regimes of inclusion and the production of space?

It is perhaps odd to broach the issue of inclusion by discussing two organizations, SPARC and Hezbollah, which have strikingly different approaches to the ethics of inclusion. Founded, in 1984, Hezbollah, the “party of God”, is the maturation of a religious militia and
is thus both militarized and fundamentalist. Also founded in 1984, SPARC is resolutely secular and resolutely non-militarized, even non-confrontational. Yet, I will argue that the simultaneous discussion of SPARC and Hezbollah yields important insights into the politics of inclusion. It also poses the issue of inclusion in the context of “war”. This war is not simply the civil war that fragmented Beirut and consolidated the power of sectarian militias, or the violent communal uprising of Hindu militias against Mumbai’s Muslims. The war in each city is also the frontier of urban renewal and primitive accumulation. This war is particularly apparent in Mumbai with an almost surreal struggle for urban land in one of the most expensive housing markets in the world. But a war waged around the spectacle of reconstruction has also eagerly followed military destruction in Beirut. How does the politics of inclusion unfold in the context of the violence that is urban renewal?

In the remainder of this paper, I analyze the three dimensions of civic governmentality: the infrastructure of populist mediation; technologies of governing; and norms of self-rule. My intent is not to compare and contrast these two organizations but rather to undertake a transnational analysis where the experiences of one context can deepen our understanding of the other. In doing so, I draw upon secondary sources ranging from academic research to policy documents to media reports; self-representations by both SPARC and Hezbollah; and my interviews with Hezbollah officials conducted in 2006. It is worth noting what this study is not: it is not an ethnographic, fine-grained observation and analysis of how these organizations function; or of the relationship between membership and leadership; or of how the work of these organizations transforms the lives of members and beneficiaries. This is important work but it is not the intent of this essay. My concern is with the “urban strategy” deployed by each organization and how that strategy unfolds in the bourgeois city and in relation to the production of space. To critique this strategy is not to discount or dismiss it but rather to shed light on the limits and contradictions of the politics of inclusion.

The Infrastructure of Populist Mediation:
We, the People

In the summer of 2006, the world was transfixed by a new round of war between Israel and Lebanon. The war provided a crucial glimpse into the ways in which Hezbollah has emerged as the de facto state in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut. If the military capacity of Hezbollah was surprising, even more surprising was the development capacity of the various institutions run and managed by Hezbollah. The global media was abuzz with stories of Hezbollah’s swift and efficient “charity” in the wake of the war, a response that
easily outdid the Lebanese state and overseas aid and assistance. But what was being revealed here was an institutional structure that is much more than charity. Hezbollah is as much an apparatus of development as it is an apparatus of war. Since its inception, Hezbollah has operated two sets of development institutions: those that provide services to targeted beneficiaries (widows, families of martyrs, wounded guerillas), and those that have a broader scope of service provision. Among the latter are Jihad al-Binaa (Jihad for construction); Al Imdad (The Resource); Islamic Society for Health; and Al Qard Al Hassan (The Good Loan) (Harb and Leenders, 2005). My own research has been focused on Al Qard Al Hassan, which is Hezbollah’s variant on the highly popular microcredit approach to poverty alleviation. Al Qard Al Hassan, with over 40,000 clients, is easily the largest microcredit institution in Lebanon and possibly in the entire Middle East! A recent Wall Street Journal article marvels at the efficiency and scope of this microcredit operation (Higgins 2006).

In similar fashion, SPARC, working with the NSDF and Mahila Milan, also provides a range of urban services to the poor of Mumbai. Working in the slums of the city, it has focused considerable effort on the upgrading of infrastructure and sanitation. From the provision of community toilets to the development of low-income housing, the Alliance does what the state is unable or unwilling to do: to enact a regime of substantive citizenship (McFarlane 2004) and ensure a material basis of survival for the urban poor in one of the most unequal cities of the world.

However, these organizations do much more than simply provide services. As implied by the idea of civic governmentality, both Hezbollah and SPARC serve as forms of government and produce governable spaces and governable subjects. In doing so, they serve as mediating institutions. Such forms of mediation complicate the simple narratives of “radical planning” and “deep democracy” through which these organizations have come to be designated, often framed as indistinguishable from the “people”. SPARC, for example, explicitly presents itself as a “bridging organization” between the state and social movements (Patel 1999:158; Patel and Mitlin 2001:9). The Federation is thus seen to be “independent from SPARC and clearly ‘owned’ by slum dwellers and not by the middle class professionals employed by the NGO”. In short, SPARC presents itself as an intermediary rather than representative of the poor.

By contrast, Hezbollah seems to exist in a seamless relationship with its members and beneficiaries, with the “people”. A recent New York Times article (Tavernise 2006) reports on an interview with a car mechanic in southern Lebanon. Asked about Hezbollah, the car mechanic argues that there can be no line drawn between Hezbollah and the “people”: “The trees in the south say, We are Hezbollah. The

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stones say, We are Hezbollah. If the people cannot talk, the stones will say it”. This is the case because Hezbollah is engaged in the creation of what it sees as a “resistance society” (Harb and Leenders 2005). To this end, Hezbollah conceptualizes its development work as a foundational element of resistance, a continuation of its open letter to the umma (global Muslim community) in 1985 that was a “declaration of the downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World” (Norton 1999). In a New York Times article written a few years ago (Sachs 2000) that interviews the general manager of Jihad al-Binaa (Jihad for Construction), Ibrahim Ismail notes that Hezbollah fights Israel through the “development of Lebanon”. Jihad al-Binaa, with its construction of housing and infrastructure, is thus a “weapon in the struggle”.

Of course, it can be argued that such mediating institutions are inherently exclusionary. Hezbollah is a Shiite organization functioning in neighborhoods and communities that are overwhelming Shiite. This religious identity is surely an axis of exclusion, excluding not only those who are not Shiite but also those Shiites who are not orthodox believers. However, the empirical research on Hezbollah is more ambiguous. Norton (1999:2) argues that Hezbollah’s services are available to all who exist in a neighborhood, be they Christian or Muslim. Harik (1996:41) concludes that Hezbollah’s members are not as deeply religious or poor or alienated as the stereotypes suggest. My own research in Beirut suggests that Hezbollah’s institutions of development are indeed open and inclusive but they exist in territories that have already been reshaped as primarily Shiite. In the case of Mumbai, there is continuing debate about whether all sections of the urban poor are indeed served by organizations such as SPARC and these debates have only intensified in the wake of the 2005 displacements.

However, in addition to the question of exclusion, there is also the question of how each of these organizations includes and governs; in other words, how regimes of inclusion are also regimes of civic governmentality.

Technologies of Governing: The Politics of Knowledge
The mediating role of Hezbollah and SPARC is undergirded by a more fundamental technology: that of the production of knowledge. Acutely aware of the mutual constitution of power and knowledge, each organization actively produces and circulates knowledge. In the case of Hezbollah, this takes the form of the Center for Contemporary Society and Development (CCSD), which documents and diagnoses poverty and exclusion and also articulates an intellectual agenda for alternative forms of development. In the case of SPARC, the strategy is far more ambitious. A core philosophy of SPARC is self-enumeration. Starting with the pathbreaking We the Invisible report (1985), SPARC has made
it possible for pavement dwellers, slum dwellers and squatters to count, categorize and map their own communities. Appadurai (2002) hails such technologies as a revolutionary form of “counter-governmentality” and as central to the politics of recognition. Indeed, SPARC itself presents its motto as “Knowledge is Power, When in Doubt Count” (annual report, 2004–2005, http://www.sparcindia.org/). I should note that Hezbollah also deploys the technologies of counting and mapping. While there has been little research on this issue, it is obvious that Hezbollah institutions have fine-grained knowledge of their communities. Most recently, as Hezbollah rebuilds southern Lebanon, there have been numerous media reports of the quick and efficient surveys of damage conducted by Hezbollah workers, from housing surveys to those of infrastructure and livelihood. However, it seems that such technologies of knowledge indicate the role of experts (eg architects and engineers) within Hezbollah rather than the more explicitly anti-expert stand of SPARC.

SPARC also promotes toilet and housing exhibitions where the urban poor, mainly through Mahila Milan, design their model toilets and model homes, thereby radically recalibrating expertise and professional power. Appadurai writes:

This is nothing less than a politics of recognition from below. When a World Bank official has to examine the virtues of a public toilet and discuss the merits of this form of shit management with the shitters themselves, the condition of poverty moves from abjection to subjectivation (Appadurai 2002:39).

SPARC not only promotes knowledge creation in the poor communities of Mumbai but also facilitates transnational exchanges of such knowledge, for example, through international networks such as Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI) so that the squatters of India can be in conversation with the squatters of South Africa. SPARC writes that such exchanges “enable low-income people to develop their own understanding of their social and economic context, not just on a micro-level but via exchange in regional and global arenas” (Patel, Bolnick and Mitlin 2001). SPARC’s production of knowledge has interesting paradoxes. On the one hand, SPARC remains acutely aware of the possible cooptation of such knowledge: “Finally a word of caution. The state, appreciating the usefulness of such groups, can easily coopt them to do much more of their work. Where should we draw the line?” (SPARC undated-a). On the other hand, in recent years, SPARC has leveraged such grassroots knowledge to bid for both state and World Bank contracts for projects that range from conducting surveys to designing community toilets. Indeed, SPARC volunteers have now been trained to meet “World Bank standards” of surveying, counting and mapping (Patel and Sharma 1998). These contracts of knowledge
production have thus turned SPARC into a unique vehicle of knowledge circulation.

Such technologies of governing, these strategies of enumeration and exhibition, have been widely hailed as empowering (Patel and Mitlin 2002:127) and “insurgent” (McFarlane 2004:897). They are a vital part of civic governmentality for these technologies make it possible for populations to “see themselves as communities able to resist these very technologies of power” (Chatterji 2005:199). They are also an important component of the “governmentalization of the state” whereby grassroots governmentality recalibrates the strategies of the state itself. Chatterji writes of such modes of inscription:

I do not mean to imply that organisations . . . follow a blueprint already drawn up in governmental policy-making. As noted, governmental rules and development plans and policies are open-ended. They do not form a seamless whole but are interwoven loosely, with gaps that allow for new connections and relationships. Organisations . . . emerge in these gaps, and in turn become part of the process by which new rules and policies are generated Chatterji (2005:206).

The Ethics of the Self: Civility

SPARC and Hezbollah are both instances of an infrastructure of populist mediation, one that deploys, in quite effective ways, technologies of governing such as strategies of enumeration and exhibition. But there are also significant differences between the populism of SPARC and that of Hezbollah. SPARC presents its agenda as pragmatic rather than ideological, as the politics of accommodation and negotiation rather than the politics of confrontation. It rejects rights-based approaches to inclusion that seek to confront the state. SPARC argues that in democratic contexts it is more important to have “rights from below” and that achieving these rights requires working with rather than against the state (Mitlin and Patel 2005a). In contrast, Hezbollah is a militarized and militant organization that often deploys violence in order to claim and assert sovereignty. However, as I will discuss later in this paper, in terms of urban citizenship, Hezbollah cultivates a quite different “ethics of the self”—one that is predicated on ideas of negotiation, resettlement and compensation rather than on confrontation and militancy. The idea of “negotiated development” is perhaps most clearly evident in the work of SPARC.

The rise of SPARC as a key civil society actor in Mumbai’s frontier of urban renewal can be traced to a pivotal 1985 Supreme Court decision. This ambiguous ruling allowed the demolition of pavement shantytowns on the grounds that the sidewalk was for “public” rather than private use. At the same time, it indicted the Mumbai municipality for harboring “prejudice against the poor and the destitute” (Mohapatra 2000:14).
SPARC articulated a strategy of "community-led" resettlement and rehabilitation and refined such a strategy in subsequent rounds of slum demolitions. Most famously, in the early 1990s, SPARC brokered the resettlement and rehabilitation of nearly 20,000 families living along Mumbai’s railway tracks on behalf of the World Bank funded Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP). SPARC saw the MUTP case as setting a new precedent for urban governance in Mumbai, one characterized by voluntary demolitions and speedy resettlement (Patel, D’Cruz and Burra 2002), thus signalling a shift from “demolition to dialogue” (D’Cruz undated). The MUTP project also led SPARC to bid for World Bank tenders: from the design of low-cost resettlement housing and community toilets to the preparation of Resettlement Action Plans and baseline socio-economic surveys (SPARC undated-b).

There is a striking gender order to SPARC’s philosophy of community-led resettlement and negotiated development. SPARC documents root the philosophy in the actions of poor women, for example those confronted by police action in the Byculla pavement settlement in 1986:

Demolition squads usually plunge people into panic and confusion. At Byculla, women and children encircled the police. Stunned and unsure of how to respond, the police sought a dialogue. They said they had orders to demolish. The women replied, ‘... Since you must demolish — let us dismantle our own huts.’ The women from other pavements joined them. Not one pot or pan was misplaced... For the first time they also tasted the power of coming together as a collective and using the power of this coming together to stop the demolition squad from breaking their huts (D’Cruz undated).

In other words, negotiated development is presented not as SPARC’s mandate but rather as a strategy of citizenship emerging from the experience of poor women. Indeed, SPARC’s official narrative presents the strategy of dialogue and negotiation as a gendered politics:

The Federation was used to the strategies of the rights based approach, vocal and public opposition on the streets and pressure for legal reform... In the 1990s, as the women leaders in Mahila Milan gained in confidence, they began to challenge the way in which they were being used by the male leadership... In 1985, when the city threatened to demolish the pavement dwellings, all NGOs and youth groups wanted to fight street battles to defend the rights of pavement dwellers to reside on the pavements of Bombay... SPARC, the support NGO, asked women in the Byculla area, who were living on pavements, and members of Mahila Milan what they wanted to do... The women said ‘... we don’t want to fight and we don’t want to stay on the pavements either! Go and speak to the municipality and to the state government and see if you can explain to them our situation.’ Mahila
Milan and NSDF began to work on their re-housing strategy and, in 1995, as a result of pavement enumerations and other lobbying, were able to ensure that pavement dwellers were included in the group of slum dwellers entitled to relocation under the Slum Rehabilitation Act . . . Federation members have become very conscious that they cannot defeat the state. Their experience is that the more oppositional their position, the more likely they are to risk violence and other forms of repression (Mitlin and Patel 2005b).

This gendered philosophy, one where women are seen as the “core of the politics of patience” (Appadurai 2002:34), is by no means unique to SPARC. It is central to philosophies of “voluntarism”, including that espoused by Hezbollah. Women volunteers are a crucial component of Hezbollah’s development apparatus (Fawaz 2000; Zaatari 2006). Known as the “volunteer sisters” they provide a close knowledge of neighborhoods and communities, thus acting as the vital link between Hezbollah and its beneficiaries (Fawaz 2000:21). And yet these women are seen only as volunteers and primarily as mothers (Zaatari 2006), their community work a “natural” extension of their role in social reproduction. Similarly SPARC, on the one hand, seeks to engender greater equality for women but, on the other hand, seeks to instrumentalize the “essential qualities” of women to achieve better processes of community development (SPARC undated-c). Note that I am using the older term, voluntarism, which precedes the more narrow term “volunteerism”. Voluntarism is not simply about volunteers; rather, it derives from the Latin voluntas and indicates “will” or “desire”. And so the feminized icon of voluntarism is empowered, she has will, she has desire. But at the same time, the gender order of development requires of her moral discipline. She is thus simultaneously the disciplined subject and the willful subject, the empowered subject and the obedient subject, the desiring subject and the altruistic subject. The production of such subjects is a key aspect of civic governmentality.

The Production of Space
The study of governmentality has primarily focused on the production of governable subjects and governable spaces. However, regimes of governmentality must also be understood as embedded in the frontiers of urban renewal and redevelopment. Once these regimes are thus situated, the emphasis shifts from the auto-production of knowledge and populist infrastructure to the calculus of development and compensation. To this end, it is worth taking a closer look at an aspect of Hezbollah and SPARC that has been rarely discussed—as agents in/of urban redevelopment. How are these organizations situated in the frontier of urban renewal? How do they reconcile their regimes of participatory and inclusive citizenship with the primitive violence of this frontier? The terms of
reconciliation, as evident in the case of Hezbollah and SPARC, are not the radical terms of the “urban commons” but rather the more calculating terms of the urban frontier. Hezbollah’s vision of a global umma animated by the voices of the downtrodden Shia is quickly replaced, at the urban scale, by an assertion of tamaddun, the city as civilization. SPARC combines, in agile fashion, its solidarity with the people with its transactions with the state and World Bank. Insisting on collaboration rather than confrontation, it thus accepts Vision Mumbai’s cliché of a slum-free “world-class” city as “very welcome initiatives [which] are representative of a genuine will to improve the face of Mumbai, of which making the city slum-free is an important component” (D’Monte 2005). Against Appadurai’s (2002:25) influential reading of SPARC as a “postdevelopmentalist vision of how the global and the local can become reciprocal instruments in the deepening of democracy”, I assert that such regimes of inclusion are inherently developmental. McFarlane (2004:910) thus notes that SPARC is challenging the terms of engagement with authorities, but not the control over urban planning and development that these authorities have.

The Politics of Compensation
One of the most obvious ways in which both Hezbollah and SPARC produce space is through their active role as housing developers. Bou Akar’s (2005) fine-grained study of the Sahra Choueifat neighborhood of Beirut shows the role of Hezbollah-affiliated real estate developers in building low-income housing in the southern suburbs of Beirut. While war-displaced families were a significant component of this clientele, other Shiite families were also served by such housing developments. Bou Akar’s work shows how such housing developments were an attempt to expand the urban territory of Hezbollah, thus extending the borders of Al-Dahiya (stereotyped as the Shiite ghetto). In other words, her analysis concludes that Hezbollah must be understood as much more than a service provider; it is also able to utilize, create and deploy market mechanisms to achieve urban development.

Similarly, as part of its resettlement efforts, SPARC has also played the role of housing developer. In 1991, Mumbai initiated an innovative Slum Redevelopment Scheme whereby developers were allowed to turn slums into market-rate housing but with some on-site, cross-subsidized housing for slum dwellers. In 1995, the newly elected Shiv Sena government extended this program by allowing the Transfer of Development Rights (with developers being able to transfer their development rights from low-income areas to other parts of the city) and removing caps on profits but also reducing the financial contributions of slum dwellers for redeveloped housing (Mukhija 2002). SPARC has been working with cooperatives of slum dwellers to develop
such housing, thus transforming its mission from advocacy to social investment (Sanyal and Mukhija 2001). It has recently established a Community-Led Infrastructure and Finance Facility (CLIFF), with funding by DFID and SIDA, and hopes to extend its role in low-income housing development and financing (Burra 2005). But this role as a housing developer has also been fraught with difficulties. Slum-dweller cooperatives have often shifted allegiances from SPARC to private developers who promise better returns on projects (Mukhija 2002). SPARC itself acknowledges that the valorization of slums might in fact be a form of gentrification, pushing out the poorest members who are not able to afford the redeveloped units. “They must start again to form a cooperative and look for an alternative land site, further outside the city where it is possible to build using low-cost designs and technology”, notes SPARC (SPARC undated-d)—an apt description of the frontier of squatting in the city of redevelopment. More important, it is evident that neither Hezbollah nor SPARC has been able to produce space at a rate that competes with other, more dominant, modes of spatial production. Indeed, Mumbai’s elaborate slum redevelopment schemes have turned out to be quite limited in their scope, yielding only 19,000 low-income apartments instead of the 800,000 apartments that had been promised by the Shiv Sena (Burra 2005).

The more important role that these organizations play in the production of space is thus through the politics of resettlement and compensation. I have noted earlier in this paper that Hezbollah’s efforts on behalf of poor Shiites has been interpreted as an example of “radical planning” (Saliba 2000). The most commonly cited example of this “radical planning” is Hezbollah’s intervention in the Elyssar project. A massive urban renewal plan initiated by the Hariri government as part of its bold postwar reconstruction of Beirut, the Elyssar project promoted the redevelopment of the southwestern suburbs. But this area was home to an estimated 80,000 poor Shiites, many of them living in informal settlements along the coast (Harb 2001:115). With the intervention of Hezbollah, the project shifted from a private enterprise to a public agency with representation by Hezbollah on the decision-making committee. Such a shift was unusual since the planning of downtown Beirut continued in privatized fashion, through the Solidere agency. Saliba (2000) hails the accomplishment as an important instance of participatory and inclusive citizenship: “Elyssar project provides an example of how the local inhabitants have participated actively in the decision-making process affecting the setting up and running of this new public corporation”. But the story is more complex. Mona Harb’s detailed investigation of the Elyssar project indicates that Hezbollah was interested not in resisting urban redevelopment but rather in shaping the terms of resettlement and compensation and in thus maintaining power and control over its Shiite “fiefdom” in Beirut (Harb 2001:117).
In fact, representation by Hezbollah did not necessarily mean the participation of the urban poor or even of municipal governments in the planning process. Harb (2001:120–121) shows how Hezbollah, through its CCSD, controlled access to all information about Elyssar, including information about rates of compensation and zones of expropriation. Indeed, Hezbollah was broadly supportive of Elyssar and argued, along with the Elyssar committee, that urban renewal was in the national interest, as in the building of a highway to the airport (Harb 2001:118). It is interesting to reflect upon Hezbollah’s discourse of redevelopment. At the end of the civil war, Hezbollah strengthened its power by negotiating on behalf of Shiites who were being displaced from the buildings they had come to occupy in downtown Beirut. Solidere (the redevelopment agency) and the Central Fund for the Displaced paid hefty compensation to Shiite families (ranging from US $15,000 to $50,000 to each of approximately 50,000 families) who then moved to the southern suburbs, some even to what was later the site of Elyssar (Sawalha 2001). The politics of inclusion then is the politics of compensation. While Hezbollah often establishes the terms of this compensation, it itself emerges as an organization through such processes of negotiation. What is important to note is that this compensation has been a terrain of differentiated inclusion. Bou Akar notes that after 2004, the Ministry for the Displaced drastically reduced compensation rates, which had been unofficially and informally set at $12,000–120,000, to the official rate of $5000, with Hezbollah’s acquiescence. Later generations of displaced Shiites were to thus find themselves unable to even afford a room in one of Al-Dahiya’s squatter settlements. Little is known about the politics of compensation in Hezbollah’s Beirut. Harb suggests that the calculus of compensation has for the most part prevented group mobilization; Bou Akar’s work similarly suggests a highly individualized negotiation where there is a certain arbitrary and fickle rather than standardized character to displacement, resettlement and compensation. How much resistance is possible within such a “resistance society”? 

In the case of SPARC, negotiations over resettlement and compensation are equally important. While this is billed as a process of “community-led resettlement”, SPARC itself notes that such processes of resettlement are made possible through World Bank guidelines on resettlement (Burra 2005; Patel, D’Cruz and Burra 2002). The World Bank policy includes the following key provisions: restoration of income and standard of living; compensation for land and structures lost; squatters and encroachers cannot be denied compensation and resettlement assistance; poor and vulnerable people must be identified and assisted. Such guidelines also require the participation of civil society organizations and indeed SPARC has been one of the main NGOs tasked with managing the process of resettlement for World Bank projects such as the Mumbai Urban Transportation Project (MUTP).
Here, as in the case of Hezbollah, the technologies of knowledge deployed by the Alliance, such as baseline and cadastral surveys, are central to such efforts.

However, SPARC’s narrative of a participatory and inclusive regime of “community-led resettlement” is belied by counter-claims put forward by different groups of the urban poor. Ironically, it is the World Bank process of resettlement, especially its grievance and inspection mechanisms, that makes it possible for such counter claims to circulate globally. World Bank documents show that in 2004 several community and shop-owner associations filed grievances against the MUTP. These ranged from concerns about the baseline surveys to great dissatisfaction with proposed resettlement sites, especially because these sites were at a considerable distance from the work and livelihood of these communities. Indeed, in 2006, for a few months, the World Bank suspended its financing of the project (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,contentMDK:20982189∼pagePK:146736∼piPK:146830∼theSitePK:223547,00.html). A letter from one of the grievant associations, that of the residents of Gazinagar, sent as an email to the World Bank feedback website on 12 July 2004, describes a tripartite meeting arranged by the MMRDA (Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority), SPARC and World Bank officers (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/ManagementResponseGazi.pdf). The grievance (Annex 6.A) explicitly rejects the role of SPARC as a representative of the poor, noting that “we cannot bear with SPARC anymore”. In light of suggestions that the MMRDA and SPARC arrange redressal committees, the complainants ask: “How can any authority conduct the hearing of a case in which the authority himself is an accused or respondent?” In short, the complainants are as distrustful of SPARC as they are of the state agency, the MMRDA. It is interesting to note the manner in which the grievance invokes the authority, legitimacy and responsibility of the World Bank. For example, it takes the MMRDA representative to task for making the statement that “this is India and not America. One cannot hold us that much accountable and responsible as Americans are!” The grievance responds: “We told him that it means that you people are not as accountable and responsible as expected by the World Bank” (emphasis added).

Such contestations over resettlement and compensation are common and SPARC should not be singled out in such a discussion. The point is not that these grievances were filed; rather the issue is that SPARC’s model of “community-led resettlement” and community self-knowledge scarcely acknowledges such forms of critique and dissent. In the efforts to create a dialogue (rather than confrontation) around resettlement, SPARC has ignored the powerful claims by a segment of Mumbai’s urban poor that resettlement disrupts the “right
to livelihood”—the argument of the Gazinagar grievance—and that in such cases development projects must find alternative resettlement sites much closer to the original site.

This politics of compensation cannot be simply dismissed as coopted or compromised forms of insurgent citizenship. Indeed, it must be taken seriously as a modality of inclusion, one that makes possible resettlement, rehabilitation and dialogue. But it can also be concluded that such forms of participation and inclusion produce a distinctive political subjectivity, one that is concerned with the calculus of compensation. This governed subject is one that seeks to be compensated. Thus McFarlane (2006:12) writes: “It is in the cut-off date that we see formal acknowledgement by the state of its approach to ‘slums’ as simultaneously violent and regulatory, sovereign and disciplinary”. But more significant, the ethics of this subject, the relation of the self to the self, is the ethics of compensation. Market estimations (the value of land), genealogical claims (cut-off dates for compensation), and moral valuations (the goodness of poor women or poor Shiites) are crucial ingredients in this ethics of compensation. And this terrain of inclusion is inevitably differentiated. On the one hand, the calculus of compensation is constantly expressed in calculative rationalities and these rationalities are internalized by the self-governing subject. On the other hand, the compensation is a time–space calculus of irrational coordinates: arbitrary cut-off dates, capricious boundaries. This produces an entrepreneurial subjectivity, one that can bargain with this fickle logic, but it also produces a subjectivity steeped in the morality of collaboration, participation and mediation. To protest, to confront, is to stand outside the parameters of citizenship. It is thus that the SPARC 2004–2005 Annual Report, written after 300,000 slum dwellers were evicted, concludes: “We continue to dialogue with the city because we are anchored in poor communities, especially the experiences of poor women ... They have no choice but to live in the city and make peace with it”. This is the power of civic governmentality.

Tamaddun: City/Civilization

The “making peace” that SPARC delineates in its recent report is also a “making space”. In both Beirut and Mumbai this is a making space for urban redevelopment and renewal. While Hezbollah negotiated compensation for those displaced by the Elyssar project, there is also an uncanny resemblance between the Elyssar vision and Hezbollah’s vision of the modernization of space (Harb 1998:179). The language used by Hezbollah is perhaps stronger and more compelling than modernization. It is that of “tamaddun”, which Harb translates as “modernization”. “Tamaddun” is perhaps more appropriately translated as “civilization”. It derives from the term “medina”, which in Arabic means both city and
civilization. This is the equivalent of city as “civitas”—but not in the sense of citizenship. Instead, it is the civilizing and modernizing frontier, the renovation of space. While Hezbollah seeks to create a “resistance society”, it is deeply implicated in the frontier of urban renewal. Elyssar is not the exception; it is the rule. Hezbollah’s city is not a counterpoint to Lebanese neoliberalism but rather a partner in it, facilitated by the wealth of the Shiite diaspora, and acutely sensitive to the iconic configurations of world-class cities. It is thus that in recent years Hezbollah has actively participated in the production of cultural and public space in Beirut. Its leadership seems eager to claim urban cosmopolitanism as a marker of modern Shiite identity. In an interview about the politics of development, the head of Hezbollah’s CCSD claimed the “Assaha” traditional village (http://www.assahavillage.com), at the edge of Al-Dahiya, as a space that captures Hezbollah’s urban and civilizational mission. A popular restaurant and entertainment complex, Assaha is in fact a project of the al-Mabarrat charity and associated with Fadlallah, rather than directly with Hezbollah (Khechen 2007). Nevertheless, this top-ranking Hezbollah official said of this space: “Beirut has had its downtown; we have only had the suburbs; now we too have our downtown; and everyone will soon come to our downtown”. This urban sensibility of recreation and entertainment, leisure and consumption (good food but no alcohol, ghazal readings, the mixing of genders, massive screens for soccer matches, wireless connectivity, Disneyesque kitsch including Nasrallah memorabilia) is one that Hezbollah can proudly claim as a marker of its modernity. Of course, this urbanism has its global dimensions. Assaha is embedded in globalized circuits of Shiite capitalism, those that are acutely aware of the tourist economy (Harb 2006). Not surprisingly, branches of Assaha, which survived the bombs that rained down on Al-Dahiya in the summer of 2006, are now opening in sites such as Doha. Prior to this war between Hezbollah and Israel, Assaha could be read as the Shiite effort to belong to the Lebanese nation. After the war, must not the Lebanese nation seek to belong to Hezbollah, the victorious protector? In such claims, the city as civilization matters.

In the winter of 2004–2005, frontiers of urban renewal were enacted in Mumbai. The city’s landscape of negotiated redevelopment and resettlement was drastically altered. Acting on a bold report by the global consulting firm, McKinsey & Company, the city put into motion “Vision Mumbai”. A cornerstone of this vision is a slum-free city, promoted by a “NGO” of the elite, Bombay First. In a matter of weeks, the state violently demolished slums, rendering 300,000 people homeless. The demolitions came to be known as the “Indian tsunami”. The brutality was deepened when the ruling party, the Congress, filed court injunctions to remove the evicted from the voting rolls. The urban poor of Mumbai were quite literally being erased from the face of the city. The “Vision Mumbai” demolitions evoked a 1995 Shiv Sena ruling that recognized
the tenure claims of squatters and slum dwellers only if these claims predated 1 January 1995. The Congress Party came to power in 2005 on the promise that it would extend this date to the year 2000. But it instead immediately turned to a “cleaning up” of the city. Vijay Patil, the municipality officer who led the demolitions, stated that it was time to turn Mumbai into the “next Shanghai” and to do so “we want to put the fear of the consequences of migration into these people. We have to restrain them from coming to Mumbai” (Biswas 2005). “How can you ask people to stop coming to Mumbai? This is a democracy”, noted urban analyst and SPARC affiliate, Kalpana Sharma (Biswas 2005). The Vision Mumbai demolitions carried neither the promise nor pretense of resettlement and rehabilitation. Indeed, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, Miloon Kothari, sharply criticized Mumbai at the UN Commission on Human Rights, noting that the city had effectively criminalized poverty and violated all expectations of humane resettlement (Khan 2005).

What then was SPARC’s role in the face of the “Indian tsunami”? In January 2005, at the height of the demolitions, Sheela Patel posted a message on the Slum/Shack Dwellers International website (http://www.sdinet.org). It is worth quoting at length from it:

All of us in SPARC who are the middle class activists wanted to do the same activities of protesting: writing articles in English newspapers . . . and undergoing all the cathartic rituals that we have become familiar with. After all, our northern donors love that, and give us funding for that—especially since everyone’s funding today is rights based . . . But a deep disgust and anger at these strategies from community leaders of federations has made us look deeper into this process . . . Communities of the poor, especially women, are clear that spurts of defiance in which their youth and men participate with support from middle class activists look good on TV and in the local newspaper, but they produce angst and fear for the women and children themselves. They have to deal with the long-term wrath of the state and the police after that . . . Much of the struggle for those of us in SPARC has been to reconcile the right to protest against injustice to creating the basis for sustainable entitlements, which the vulnerable in the city truly need to begin to build their live . . . Is this a rights based approach or a need based one? Will the international community that valorises and finances struggles for entitlements, and the whole range of human rights acknowledge this as part of the pantheon of human rights activism? Or will this be dubbed as reformist and welfare? (emphasis added).

In contrast to SPARC’s recommendation of dialogue and negotiation, a confrontation bubbled to the surface in Mumbai. The National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), led by Medha Patkar, and other Narmada Dam activists, organized evicted slum dwellers around the idea of “struggle”. Diagnosing Vision Mumbai as yet another expression
of “imperialist globalisation based on neoliberalism”, the movement sought to counter the persistent forms of displacement through which frontiers of accumulation are forged. While SPARC rejected a rights-based approach, NAPM framed the “Shanghaification of Mumbai” as primarily an issue of rights: whether the urban-rural poor have a “right over urban space” (Patkar and Athialy 2005). Their analysis did not spare SPARC’s community-led rehabilitation and resettlement, suggesting that instead of simply making space for redevelopment, should not the poor assert their rights? “In Mumbai, 60 per cent live in the slums. Shouldn’t they have a right over 60 per cent of the land in Mumbai?” Had the revolution finally arrived in Mumbai? Ironically, it is the NAPM’s earlier work in the Narmada Valley that had pushed the World Bank to create the rules and regulations of resettlement, rehabilitation and compensation that were later so efficiently implemented by SPARC in Mumbai.

Since then, this struggle has spread to other sites in India. In the winter of 2006–2007, urban squatters and sharecroppers and peasants in the state of West Bengal united against the efforts of the state government (a leftist one at that) to confiscate land for urban and industrial development. A new political moment seems to have been born in India, one that lays down a challenge to SPARC’s institutionalized inclusion. A key issue in the West Bengal struggles has been the question of “consent”: did those being displaced consent to the land acquisition and to the terms of compensation? Was this therefore “voluntary” rather than forceful displacement, a sign of the rational rather than violent state? But what do consent and choice mean in the context of an economic structure that leaves the rural–urban poor without recourse to secure employment or land tenure? Do such groups have the power to grant or withhold consent in the face of violence that is not simply state repression but also the sheer material and symbolic violence of socio-economic inequality (Roy 2007)? The NAPM counters such ambiguities of negotiated development and community-led resettlement through the assertion of rights, the right to the city.

But as the “Indian tsunami” poses questions about the contradictions and limits of SPARC’s strategy, so SPARC’s long history of pragmatism and dialogue poses questions about the new rights-based political mobilization. Will rebellious citizenship ensure the right to the production of space for the urban poor or will it leave them without access to the infrastructure of populist mediation and its regulated entitlements? In a recent muse on the question of rights, Sheela Patel (2007) notes that “there is not much point in pro-poor legal entitlements that cannot be actualised by those for whom it is intended”. It is important therefore to read SPARC’s work not simply as compromise and cooptation but rather as strategy. It is thus that SPARC has strategically focused on sanitation rather than land tenure, recognizing
the ways in which such a strategy avoids violent confrontation and impossible expectations while also appealing to the middle-class sensibilities of a clean and ordered city (Burra, Patel and Kerr 2003; Patel 2004). Similarly, community-led resettlement has been strategically governed by the idea that displacement cannot be avoided in cities where governments seek to improve the provision of infrastructure and services (Patel, D’Cruz and Burra 2002:159). The question that must now be answered is whether such an urban strategy can outsmart the “bourgeois environmentalism” (Baviskar 2003) and brutal primitive violence that is unfolding in Indian cities. Can the civility of civic governmentality survive and tackle this war?

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